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Abstract
A wide variety of works have explored the reason for the
existence of adversarial examples, but there is no consensus
on the explanation. We propose to treat the DNN logits as
a vector for feature representation, and exploit them to an-
alyze the mutual influence of two independent inputs based
on the Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC). We utilize this
vector representation to understand adversarial examples
by disentangling the clean images and adversarial pertur-
bations, and analyze their influence on each other. Our re-
sults suggest a new perspective towards the relationship be-
tween images and universal perturbations: Universal per-
turbations contain dominant features, and images behave
like noise to them. This feature perspective leads to a new
method for generating targeted universal adversarial per-
turbations using random source images. We are the first to
achieve the challenging task of a targeted universal attack
without utilizing original training data. Our approach us-
ing a proxy dataset achieves comparable performance to the
state-of-the-art baselines which utilize the original training
dataset.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown impressive
performance in numerous applications, ranging from im-
age classification [16, 48] to motion regression [8, 47].
However, DNNs are also known to be vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks [42, 38]. A wide variety of previous
works [14, 43, 44, 21, 34, 3] explore the reason for the ex-
istence of adversarial examples, but there is a lack of con-
sensus on the explanation [1]. While the working mecha-
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Figure 1. Based on our observation that adversarial perturbations
contain dominant features and images behave like noise to them,
we design a new method of generating targeted universal adversar-
ial perturbations without data, by using a proxy dataset.
nism of DNNs is not fully understood, one widely accepted
interpretation considers DNNs as feature extractors [16],
which inspires the recent work [17] to link the existence of
adversarial examples to non-robust features in the training
dataset.
Contrary to previous works analyzing adversarial exam-
ples as a whole (summation of image and perturbation), we
instead propose to analyze adversarial examples by disen-
tangling image and perturbations and studying their mutual
influence. Specifically, we analyze the influence of two
independent inputs on each other in terms of contributing
to the obtained feature representation when the inputs are
combined. We treat the network logit outputs as a means
of feature representation. Traditionally, only the most im-
portant logit values, such as the highest logit value for
classification tasks, are considered while other values are
disregarded. We propose that all logit values contribute
to the feature representation and therefore treat them as a
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logit vector. We utilize the Pearson correlation coefficient
(PCC) [2] to analyze the extent of linear correlation between
logit vectors. The PCC values computed between the logit
vectors of each independent input and the input combina-
tion gives insight on the contribution of the two indepen-
dent inputs towards the combined feature representation.
Our proposed general analysis framework is shown to be
useful for analyzing influence of any two independent in-
puts, such as images, Gaussian noise, perturbations, etc. In
this work, we limit the focus on analyzing the influence of
image and perturbation in universal attacks. Our findings
show that for a universal attack, the adversarial examples
(AEs) are strongly correlated to the UAP, while a low corre-
lation is observed between AEs and input images (see Fig-
ure 4). This suggests that for a DNN, UAPs dominate over
the clean images in AEs, even though the images are visu-
ally more dominant. Treating the DNN as feature extrac-
tor, we naturally conclude that the UAP has features that
are more dominant compared to the features of the images
to attack. Consequently we claim that “UAPs are features
while images behave like noise to them”. This is contrary
to the general perception that treats the perturbation as noise
to images in adversarial examples. Our interpretation thus
provides a simple yet intuitive insight on the working of
UAPs.
The observation, that images behave like noise to UAPs
motivates the use of proxy images to generate targeted
UAPs without original training data, as shown in Figure 1.
Our proposed approach is more practical because the train-
ing data is generally inaccessible to the attacker [33]. Our
contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose to treat the DNN logits as a vector for fea-
ture representation. These logit vectors can be used to
analyze the contribution of features of two independent
inputs when summed towards the output. In particular,
our analysis results regarding universal attacks reveal
that in an AE, the UAP has dominant features, while
the image behaves like noise to them.
• We leverage this insight to derive a method using ran-
dom source images as proxy dataset to generate tar-
geted UAPs without original training data. To our best
knowledge, we are the first to fulfill this challenging
task while achieving comparable performance to the
state-of-the-art baselines utilizing the original training
dataset.
2. Related Work
We summarize previous works with two focuses: (1) ex-
planations of adversarial vulnerability and (2) existing ad-
versarial attack methods.
Explanation of adversarial vulnerability. Goodfel-
low et al. attribute the reason of adversarial examples to
the local linearity of DNNs, and support their claim by
their proposed simple yet effective FGSM [14]. However,
this linearity hypothesis is not fully compatible with the
existence of adversarial examples which violate local lin-
earity [25]. Moreover, it can not fully explain the phe-
nomenon that greater robustness is not observed in less
linear classifiers [3, 43, 44]. Another body of works at-
tributes the reason for low adversarial robustness to high-
dimensional input properties [41, 10, 26, 13]. However,
reasonably robust DNNs of high-dimensional inputs can
be trained in practice [25, 37]. One recent work [17] at-
tributes the reason for the existence of adversarial exam-
ples to non-robust features in the dataset. Some previous
explanations, ranging from limited training data induced
over-fitting [40, 44] to robustness under noise [11, 12, 6],
are well aligned with their framework [17]. The concept
of non-robust features is also implicitly explored in other
works [4, 34]. On the other hand, possible reasons for vul-
nerability against universal adversarial perturbations have
been explored in [28, 29, 18, 30]. Their analysis is mainly
based on the network decision boundaries, in particular, the
existence of universal perturbations is linked to the large
curvature of decision boundary. Our work mainly focuses
on the explanation of universal adversarial vulnerability.
One core aspect that differentiates our analysis framework
from previous works is that we explore the influence of im-
ages and perturbations on each other, while previous works
mainly analyze adversarial example as a whole [28, 29, 18].
We explicitly analyze how the image and perturbations in-
fluence each other. Our analysis framework is mainly based
on the proposed logit vector interpretation of how DNNs
respond to the features in the input, without relying on the
curvature property of decision boundaries [28, 29, 18].
Existing adversarial attack methods. The existing at-
tacks are commonly categorized under image-dependent at-
tacks [42, 14, 23, 31, 5] and universal (i.e. image-agnostic)
attacks [28, 19, 33, 27, 36, 46, 35] which devise one single
perturbation to attack most images. Image-dependent attack
techniques have been explored in a variety of works rang-
ing from optimization based techniques [42, 5] to FGSM
related techniques [14, 23, 7, 45]. Universal adversarial per-
turbations (UAPs) were first proposed by [28], and deploy
the DeepFool attack [31] iteratively on single data samples.
Due to the nature of being image-agnostic, universal attacks
constitute a more challenging task than image-dependent
ones.
Another way to categorize attacks is non-targeted vs. tar-
geted attacks. Generative targeted universal perturbations
have been explored by [36]. Targeted attacks can be seen as
a special, but more challenging case of non-targeted attacks.
Class discriminative (CD) UAPs were proposed in [46],
aiming to fool only a subset of classes. The above men-
tioned universal attacks require utilization of the original
training data. However, in practice the attacker often has
no access to the training data [33]. To overcome this lim-
itation, Mopuri et al. propose to generate universal pertur-
bation without training data [33]. However, their approach
is specifically designed for non-targeted attacks by maxi-
mizing the activation scores in every layer, and their perfor-
mance is inferior to approaches with access to original train-
ing data. Another attempt for data-free non-targeted univer-
sal attack by training a network to generate proxy images is
explored in [39] . No prior work is found to have achieved
targeted universal attack without access to the original train-
ing data, and our work is the first attempt in this direction.
3. Analysis Framework
3.1. Logit Vector
Following the common consensus that DNNs are fea-
ture extractors, we intend to analyze adversarial examples
from the feature perspective. The logit values are often
used as an indicator of feature presence in an image. Pre-
vious works [18, 17], however, mainly focus only on the
DNN highest logit output indicating the predicted class,
while all other logits are usually neglected. “Logits” re-
fer to the DNN output before the final softmax layer. In this
work, we assume that all DNN output logit values represent
the network response to features in the input. One concern
about this vector interpretation is that only the logits of the
ground-truth classes or other semantically similar classes
are meaningful, while the other logits might be just random
(small) values and thus do not carry important information.
We address this concern after introducing the terms and no-
tation used throughout this work.
A deep classifier Cˆ maps an input image x ∈ Rd with a
pixel range of [0, 1] to an output logit vector Lx = Cˆ(x).
The vectorLx hasK entries corresponding to the total num-
ber of classes. The predicted class yx of an input x can then
be calculated from the logit vector as yx = argmax(Lx).
We adopt the logit vector to facilitate the analysis of the
mutual influence of two independent inputs in terms of
their contribution to the combined feature representation.
We mainly consider two independent inputs a ∈ Rd and
b ∈ Rd, which can be images, Gaussian noise, perturba-
tions, etc., whose corresponding logit vectors are denoted
as La and Lb, respectively. The summation of these two
inputs c = a + b, when fed to a DNN, leads to the feature
representation Lc. Both inputs a and b contribute partially
to Lc. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that the con-
tribution of each input will be influenced by the other one.
Specifically, the extent of influence will be reflected in the
linear correlation between the individual logit vector La (or
Lb) and Lc.
Figure 2. Images and their logit vector analysis. The first row
shows the sample images a and b and the resulting image c. The
second row shows the plots of logit vector Lc over La (left) and
Lb (right), with their respective PCC values.
3.2. Pearson Correlation Coefficient
In statistics, the Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) [2]
is a widely adopted metric to measure the linear correlation
between two variables. In general, this coefficient is defined
as
PCCX,Y =
cov(X,Y )
σXσY
, (1)
where cov indicates the covariance and σX and σY are the
standard deviation of vector X and Y , respectively, and the
PCC values range from −1 to 1. The absolute value indi-
cates the extent to which the two variables are linearly cor-
related, with 1 indicating perfect linear correlation, 0 indi-
cating zero linear correlation, and the sign indicates whether
they are positively or negatively correlated. Treating the
logit vector as a variable, the PCC between different logit
vectors can be calculated. We are mainly concerned about
PCCLa,Lc and PCCLb,Lc , since PCCLa,Lb is always close
to zero due to independence. Comparing PCCLa,Lc and
PCCLb,Lc can provide insight about the contribution of the
two inputs to Lc, with a higher PCC value indicating the
more significant contributor. For example, if PCCLa,Lc is
larger than PCCLb,Lc , input a’s share can be seen as more
dominant than input b towards the final feature response.
The relationship of two logit vectors, La and Lc for in-
stance, can be visualized by plotting each logit pair. The
extent of their correlation can be observed and quantified
by the PCC.
As a basic example, we show the logit vector analysis of
two randomly sampled images from ImageNet [22] in Fig-
ure 2. The plot shows a strong linear correlation between Lb
and Lc (PCCLb,Lc = 0.88), while La and Lc are practically
uncorrelated (PCCLa,Lc = 0.19). These observations sug-
gest a dominant contribution of input b towards logit vector
Lc. As a result, the same label “Wood rabbit” is predicted
for c and b. Such combination of images has also been ex-
plored in Mixup [49] for training classifiers.
Table 1. PCC analysis for VGG19 using 1000 image pairs ran-
domly sampled from the ImageNet test set. Here, for each image
pair, the mean and standard deviations of higher and lower PCC
values are reported under PCCh and PCCl, respectively.
|S| PCCh PCCl PCCh − PCCl PPCC
Sm 445 0.74± 0.10 0.27± 0.23 0.47± 0.27 96%
Sn 555 0.63± 0.13 0.33± 0.20 0.30± 0.22 -
To establish the reliability of the PCC value as a metric,
we repeat the above experiment with 1000 image pairs and
report results on the effectiveness of PCC to predict label
c in Table 1. We divide the image pairs into two groups:
Sm and Sn. Sm comprises of image pairs having the same
predicted class yc as the prediction ya or yb. For Sn, the
predicted class yc is different from both ya and yb. More-
over, we use the parameter PPCC to show the proportion of
predictions correctly inferred from the PCC values relative
to the network predictions for c. For the image pairs from
set Sm, the PPCC is 96%, confirming the reliability of the
PCC as our metric. The high gap between PCCh and PCCl
further provides evidence for the high PPCC. For the im-
age pairs from Sn, PCCh − PCCl is smaller, implying that
neither of the inputs is significantly dominant.
Recall that there is a concern that most logit values might
be just random values, which is partially addressed by ob-
serving the correlation between PCC and yc as shown in
Figure 2. If the concern were valid, such that only a few log-
its are meaningful (i.e. only the highest logits or the logits
for semantically similar classes), a high divergence should
be observed for the less significant logits. However, this as-
sumption does not align well with the results in Figure 2,
thus confirming the importance of all logit values. A higher
PCC value for the dominant input further rules out the con-
cern that the lower logit values are random.
4. Influence of Images and Perturbations on
Each Other
In this section, we analyze the interaction of clean im-
ages with Gaussian noise perturbation, universal perturba-
tions and image-dependent perturbations. In doing so, input
a is the image and input b the perturbation. The analysis is
performed on VGG19 pretrained on ImageNet. For consis-
tency, a randomly chosen a (shown in Figure 2, top left) is
used for all experiments. Along the same lines, for targeted
perturbations we randomly set ‘sea lion’ as the target class t.
For more results with different images and target classes on
different networks, please refer to the supplementary mate-
rial.
Figure 3. Logit vector analysis for an input image and Gaussian
noiseN (µ, σ). The analysis is shown for µ = 0 and σ = 0 (left),
σ = 0.1 (middle) and σ = 0.2 (right))
Figure 4. Logit vector analysis for input image (a) and targeted
UAP (b). The targeted UAP was trained for target class ‘sea lion’
and loss function LtCL2
4.1. Analysis of Gaussian Noise
To facilitate the interpretation of our main experiment of
performing analysis for perturbations, we first show the in-
fluence of noise (Gaussian noise) on images. The Gaussian
noise is sampled from N (µ, σ) with µ = 0 and different
standard deviations. The relationship between La, Lc is vi-
sualized in Figure 3. As expected, by adding zero magni-
tude Gaussian noise (i.e. no Gaussian noise) to the image,
La andLc are perfectly linearly correlated (PCCLa,Lc = 1).
If the Gaussian noise magnitude is increased (σ = 0.1 for
instance), La and Lc still show a high linear correlation
(PCCLa,Lc = 0.91). Investigating the relationship between
Lb and Lc, a low correlation can be observed for all noise
inputs b indicating a low contribution to the final prediction.
4.2. Analysis of Universal Perturbations
Universal perturbations come in two flavors: targeted
and non-targeted. We use Algorithm 1 with loss function
LtCL2 to generate targeted universal perturbations, and gen-
erate non-targeted universal perturbations using Equation 4
as the loss function. The results of this analysis are shown
for a targeted and non-targeted UAP in Figure 4 and Fig-
ure 5, respectively. For the targeted scenario, two major
Figure 5. Logit vector analysis for input image (a) and non-
targeted UAP (b). The UAP was trained with loss function Equa-
tion 4
Figure 6. Logit vector analysis for input image (a) and targeted
image-dependent perturbation (b). The perturbation was crafted
with PGD [25], with target class ‘sea lion’
observations can be made: First, PCCLa,Lc is smaller than
PCCLb,Lc , indicating a higher linear correlation betweenLc
and Lb than Lc and La. In other words, the features of the
perturbation are more dominant than that of the clean im-
age. Second, PCCLa,Lc is close to 0, indicating that the
influence of the perturbation on the image is so significant
that the clean image features are seemingly unrecognizable
to the DNN. In fact, comparing the logit analysis of La and
Lc in Figure 4 with that of Gaussian noise and image in Fig-
ure 3 (bottom), a striking similarity is observed. This offers
a novel interpretation of targeted universal perturbations:
Targeted universal perturbations themselves (indepen-
dent of the images to attack) are features, while images
behave like noise to them. We further explore the non-
targeted perturbations, and report the results in Figure 5.
Similar to targeted universal perturbations, the PCCLa,Lc
is smaller than PCCLb,Lc for the non-targeted perturbation.
However the dominance of the non-targeted perturbation is
not as significant as that of the targeted perturbation.
4.3. Analysis of Image-Dependent Perturbations
The logit vector analysis results for targeted and non-
targeted image-dependent perturbations are reported in Fig-
ure 6 and Figure 7, respectively. Contrary to the univer-
sal perturbations, the image-dependent perturbations are
weakly correlated to c, and have a noise-like behaviour
(Figure 3). However, the image gets misclassified even
Figure 7. Logit vector analysis for input image (a) and non-
targeted image-dependent perturbation (b). The perturbation was
crafted with PGD [25]
though the image features appear to be more dominant than
the perturbation. This is because the image features are
more strongly corrupted through the image-dependent per-
turbation than Gaussian noise. This special behavior ap-
pears due to the fact that the image-dependent perturbations
are crafted to form concrete features only in combination
with the image. Such image-dependent behavior violates
our assumption of independent inputs. However, we include
these results since they offer additional insight into adver-
sarial examples.
4.4. Why Do Adversarial Perturbations Exist?
A wide variety of works have explored the existence of
adversarial examples as discussed in section 2. Based on
our previous analyses, we arrive at the following explana-
tion for the existence of UAPs:
Universal adversarial perturbations contain features in-
dependent of the images to attack. The image features are
corrupted to an extent of being unrecognizable to a DNN,
and thus the input images behave like noise to the perturba-
tion features.
The finding in [18] that universal perturbations behave
like features of a certain class aligns well with our state-
ment. Jetley et al. argue that universal perturbations ex-
ploit the high-curvature image-space directions to behave
like features, while our finding suggests that universal per-
turbations themselves contain features independent of the
images to attack. Utilizing the perspective of positive cur-
vatures of decision boundaries, Jetley et al. adopt the deci-
sion boundary-based attack DeepFool [31]. However, our
explanation does not explicitly rely on the decision bound-
ary properties, but focuses on the occurrences of strong fea-
tures, robust to the influence of images. We can therefore
deploy the PGD algorithm to generate perturbations con-
sisting of target class features similar to [17].
If universal perturbations themselves contain features in-
dependent of the images to attack, do image-dependent per-
turbations behave in a similar way? As previously dis-
cussed, the analysis results in Figure 6 reveal that the be-
havior of image-dependent perturbations is not like features,
but noise. On the other hand, the original image features
are retained to a high extent. Ilyas et al. [17] revealed that
image-dependent adversarial examples include the features
of the target class. However, as seen from the analysis in
subsection 4.4, the isolated perturbation seems not to retain
independent features due its low PCC value, but rather in-
teracts with the image to form the adversarial features.
5. Targeted UAP with Proxy Data
Our above analysis demonstrates that images behave like
noise to the universal perturbation features. Since the im-
ages are treated like noise, we can exploit proxy images
as background noise to generate targeted UAPs without the
original training data. The proxy images do not need to have
any class object belonging to the original training class and
their main role is to make the targeted UAP have strong
background-robust target class features.
5.1. Problem Definition
Formally, given a data distribution X ∈ Rd of images,
we compute a single perturbation vector v that satisfies
Cˆ(x+ v) = t for most x ∼ X
||v||p ≤ .
(2)
The magnitude of v is constrained by  to be imperceptible
to humans. || · ||p refers to the lp-norm and in this work,
we set p = ∞ and  = 10 for images in range [0, 255]1 as
in [28]. Specifically, we assume having no access to original
training data. Thus, the training data Xv for v generation
can be different from the original dataset X . We denote the
proxy dataset as Xv .
To evaluate targeted UAPs, we use the targeted fooling
ratio metric [36], i.e. the ratio of samples fooled into the
target class to the number of all data samples. We also use
the non-targeted fooling ratio [36, 28], calculating the ratio
of misclassified samples to the total number of samples, for
evaluation.
5.2. Loss Function and Algorithm
To achieve the desired objective Eq. 2 most naively, the
commonly used cross-entropy loss function LCE can be uti-
lized. Since cross-entropy loss holistically incorporates log-
its of all classes, this loss function leads to overall lower
fooling ratios. This behavior can be resolved by using a
loss function LL that only aims to increase the logit of the
target class.
Since we consider universal perturbations, to balance the
above objective between different samples in training, we
extend LL by clamping the logit values as follows:
LtCL1 = max(max
i 6=t
Cˆi(xv + v)− Cˆt(xv + v),−κ) (3)
1For images in the range [0, 1],  = 10
255
Algorithm 1: UAP algorithm
Input: Proxy data Xv , Classifier Cˆ, Loss function L,
mini-batch size m, Number of iterations I ,
perturbation magnitude 
Output: Perturbation vector v
v ← 0 . Initialize
for iteration = 1, . . . , I do
B ∼ Xv: |B| = m . Randomly sample
gv ← E
x∼B
[∇vL] . Calculate gradient
v ← Optim(gv) . Update
v ←  v||v||p . Norm projection
end
where κ indicates the confidence value, xv are samples from
the proxy data Xv and Cˆi indicates the i-th entry of the logit
vector. In this case, the proxy data can be either a random
source dataset or the original training data, depending on
data availability. Note that similar techniques of clamping
the logits have also been used in [5], however, their moti-
vation is to obtain minimum-magnitude (image-dependent)
perturbations. While the target logit in loss function LtCL1
is increased, the logit values of max Cˆi(xv + v) are de-
creased simultaneously during the training process. This
effect is undesirable for generating a UAP with strong target
class features, since other classes except the target classes
will be included in the optimization, which might have neg-
ative effects on the gradient update. To prevent manipula-
tion of logits other than the target class, we exclude the non-
targeted class logit values in the optimization step, such that
these values are only used as a reference value for clamping
the target class logit. We indicate this loss function asLtCL2.
We report an ablation study of the different loss function
performances in Table 2. The results suggest that LtCL2,
in general, outperforms all other discussed loss functions.
We further provide a loss function resembling LtCL2 for the
generation of non-targeted UAPs.
Lnt = max(Cˆgt(xv + v)−max
i6=gt
Cˆi(xv + v),−κ) (4)
In the special case of crafting non-targeted UAPs, the proxy
dataset has to be the original training dataset.
We provide a simple, yet effective algorithm in Algo-
rithm 1. Our gradient based method adopts the ADAM [20]
optimizer and mini-batch training, which have also been
adopted in the context of data-free universal adversarial per-
turbations [39]. Mopuri et al. train a generator network for
crafting UAPs with this configurations, which can be con-
sidered more complex.
Table 2. Ablation study on the performance of different loss functions, for the proposed targeted UAP. The values in each column represent
mean and standard deviation of the non-targeted fooling ratio (%) and targeted fooling ratio (%) obtained for 5 runs and target class ‘sea
lion’.
Loss AlexNet GoogleNet VGG16 VGG19 ResNet152
LCE 90.5± 0.6 55.4± 1.0 70.8± 1.5 55.2± 2.2 89.1± 0.3 75.9± 0.9 87.9± 0.5 70.8± 1.1 78.2± 0.9 66.5± 1.3
LL 89.2± 0.4 47.1± 1.1 71.6± 0.8 56.9± 1.1 91.0± 0.3 79.0± 0.6 90.8± 0.2 73.1± 0.8 80.1± 0.8 69.1± 0.4
LtCL1 90.2± 0.3 57.6± 1.4 71.7± 1.4 57.9± 2.3 90.1± 0.4 80.3± 0.5 88.2± 0.3 75.5± 0.6 80.2± 0.3 71.4± 0.5
LtCL2 90.5± 0.3 49.4± 1.2 73.0± 1.5 58.4± 2.2 93.5± 0.3 82.8± 0.7 92.7± 0.1 72.3± 2.5 81.3± 1.1 70.6± 2.1
Table 3. Results for targeted UAPs trained on four different datasets. The values in each column represent mean and standard deviation of
the non-targeted fooling ratio (%) and targeted fooling ratio (%) obtained for 8 different target classes.
Proxy Data AlexNet GoogleNet VGG16 VGG19 ResNet152
ImageNet [22] 89.9± 2.2 48.6± 13.3 77.7± 3.2 59.9± 6.6 92.5± 1.3 75.0± 7.8 91.6± 1.3 71.6± 6.9 80.8± 2.6 66.3± 7.0
COCO [24] 89.9± 2.6 47.2± 13.1 76.8± 3.7 59.8± 7.5 92.2± 1.7 75.1± 12.3 91.6± 1.5 68.8± 9.4 79.9± 2.9 65.7± 7.8
VOC [9] 88.9± 2.6 46.9± 12.7 76.7± 3.2 58.9± 6.0 92.2± 1.6 74.7± 7.9 90.5± 2.3 68.8± 8.2 79.1± 3.3 65.2± 7.1
Places365 [50] 90.0± 2.1 42.6± 16.4 76.4± 3.7 60.0± 5.4 92.1± 1.5 73.4± 9.6 91.5± 1.6 64.5± 17.0 78.0± 3.2 62.5± 9.9
Table 4. Comparison of the proposed method to other methods.
The results are divided in universal attacks with access to the orig-
inal ImageNet training data (upper) and data-free methods (lower).
The metric is reported in the non-targeted fooling ratio (%))
Method AlexNet GoogleNet VGG16 VGG19 ResNet152
UAP [28] 93.3 78.9 78.3 77.8 84.0
GAP [36] - 82.7 83.7 80.1 -
Ours(ImageNet) 96.17 88.94 94.30 94.98 90.08
FFF [33] 80.92 56.44 47.10 43.62 -
AAA [39] 89.04 75.28 71.59 72.84 60.72
GD-UAP [32] 87.02 71.44 63.08 64.67 37.3
Ours (COCO) 89.9 76.8 92.2 91.6 79.9
Table 5. Transferability results for the proposed targeted universal
adversarial attack. The attack was performed for target class ‘sea
lion’ and proxy dataset MS-COCO. The rows indicate the source
model and the columns indicates the target model. The values in
each column are reported in the non-targeted fooling ratio (%) and
targeted fooling ratio (%)
AlexNet GoogleNet VGG-16 VGG19 ResNet152
AlexNet 90.45 49.61 54.77 0.01 60.43 0.13 58.66 0.09 47.02 0.02
GoogleNet 53.25 0.02 75.47 62.06 50.51 0.17 48.79 0.14 34.94 0.34
VGG16 53.71 0.03 41.26 0.02 93.62 82.90 82.99 13.69 36.73 0.01
VGG19 53.67 0.02 39.78 0.02 83.40 44.53 92.53 75.61 35.36 0.01
ResNet152 54.46 0.03 42.43 0.07 55.05 1.63 55.12 1.05 80.47 70.20
Table 6. Results for Transferability measured with PCC values.
Generated with COCO as background, for target class sea lion.
The rows indicate the source model and the columns indicates the
target model.
AlexNet GoogleNet VGG-16 VGG19 ResNet152
AlexNet 1.00 0.09 0.24 0.14 −0.05
GoogleNet 0.24 1.00 0.24 0.14 0.00
VGG16 0.36 0.09 1.00 0.48 −0.11
VGG19 0.19 0.07 0.55 1.00 −0.09
ResNet152 0.28 0.11 0.36 0.30 1.00
5.3. Main Results
We generate the targeted UAPs for four different
datasets, the ImageNet training set as well as three proxy
datasets. In Algorithm 1, we set the number of iterations to
1000, use loss function LtCL2 and a learning rate of 0.005
with batch-size 32. As the proxy datasets, we use images
from MS-COCO [24] and Pascal VOC [9], two widely used
object detection datasets, and Places365 [50], a large-scale
scene recognition dataset. We generated targeted UAPs
with the 4 datasets for 8 different target classes and evaluate
them on the ImageNet test dataset. The average over the 8
target scenarios are reported in Table 3. Two major observa-
tions can be made: First, a significant difference can not be
observed for the three different proxy datasets. Moreover,
there is only a marginal performance gap between training
with the proxy datasets and training with the original Ima-
geNet training data. The results support our assumption that
the influence of the input images on targeted UAPs is like
noise.
We also explored generating targeted UAPs with white
images and Gaussian noise as the proxy dataset. In both
scenarios, inferior performance was observed. We refer the
reader to the supplementary material for a discussion about
possible reasons and further results.
Targeted perturbations for different networks are shown
in Figure 8. Since the target class is sea lion, we can no-
tice the existence of sea lion-like patterns by taking a closer
look. Samples of clean images and perturbed images mis-
classified as sea lion are shown in Figure 9.
5.4. Comparison with Previous Methods
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
achieve targeted UAP without original training data, thus
we can only compare our performance with previous works
on related tasks. The authors of [36] report a targeted fool-
Figure 8. Targeted universal perturbations (target class ‘sea lion’)
for different network architectures.
Figure 9. Qualitative Results. Clean images (top) and perturbed
images (bottom) for VGG19
ing ratio of 52% for Inception-V3 with access to the Ima-
geNet training dataset. We use COCO as the proxy dataset
and achieve a superior performance of 53.4%. We can not
find any other targeted UAP method available in the litera-
ture but other previous works report the (non-targeted) fool-
ing ratio and we compare our performance with them and
the results are available in Table 4. We distinguish between
methods with and without data availability. To compare
with the methods with data-availability we trained a non-
targeted UAP on ImageNet utilizing our introduced non-
targeted loss function from Equation 4. Note that we do
not block the gradient for max
i 6=gt
Cˆi(xv + v) to let the algo-
rithm automatically search a dominant class for an effec-
tive attack. We observe that our approach achieves superior
performance than both UAP [28] and GAP [36]. For the
case without access to the original training dataset, we use
the COCO dataset to generate the UAP, and report the av-
erages of performance on 8 target classes. Note that our
method still generates a targeted UAP, but we use the non-
targeted metric for performance evaluation. This setting is
in favor of other methods, since ideally, we could report the
best performance of a certain target class. Without bells and
whistles, our method achieves comparable performance to
the state-of-the-art data-free methods, constituting evidence
that our simple approach is efficient.
5.5. Transferability
The transferability results are available in Table 5. We
observe that the non-targeted transferability performs rea-
sonably well, while targeted transferability does not. We
find no previous work reporting the targeted transferability
for universal perturbations. For image-dependent perturba-
tions, the targeted transferability has been explored in [15],
which reveals that the targeted transferability is unsatisfac-
tory when source network and target network belong to dif-
ferent network families. When the networks belong to the
same network family, relatively higher transferability can
be observed [15]. This aligns well with our finding that
VGG16 and VGG19 transfer reasonably well between each
other as presented in Table 5. We further report the PCC of
the two network UAPs in Table 6. We observe that the PCC
values are relatively higher between VGG16 and VGG19
than other networks, indicating an additional benefit of PCC
to provide insight to network transferability.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we treat the DNN logit output as a vector to
analyze the influence of two independent inputs in terms of
contributing to the combined feature representation. Specif-
ically, we demonstrate that the Pearson correlation coef-
ficient (PCC) can be used to analyze relative contribution
and dominance of each input. Under the proposed analysis
framework, we analyze adversarial examples by disentan-
gling images and perturbations to explore their mutual influ-
ence. Our analysis results reveal that universal perturbations
have dominant features and the images to attack behave like
noise them. This new insight yields a simple yet effective al-
gorithm, with a carefully designed loss function, to generate
targeted UAPs by exploiting a proxy dataset instead of the
original training data. We are the first to achieve this chal-
lenging task and the performance is comparable to state-of-
the-art baselines utilizing the original training dataset.
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